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THE EUROPEAN RAILWAY AGENCY UNDER THE FOURTH 
RAILWAY PACKAGE: A POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
BY 
MERlJN CHAMON 
DOCTEllII EN D LIOLT ET ASSISTANT ACIIllEMlclUE All GIlEN'I' EIIROPI':IIN LAw TNSTIT1)TE 
The present symposium offers a perfect occasion to look at 
the European Railway Agency (ERA) from a number of different 
perspectives. Under the current proposals of the Commission, the 
ERA's mandate would be reviewed a second time, again strengthe-
ning the ERA's powers. Under the fourth railway package, the ERA 
would become a genuine decision-making agency. This is clear 
from the fact that a Board of Appeal would be established within 
the agency. Such Boards of Appeal are only being established in 
decision-making agencies, as litigants wishing to challenge a bin-
ding act of such agencies must first seize the internal Board of 
Appeal of that agency, before a procedure may be lodged at the 
General Court. 
The new role for the ERA, as envisaged by the Commission, wlll 
be placed in the broader context of the agenc'~fication of the EU 
administration. From a political perspective, the fourth railway pac-
kage will be seized to look at the different interests at stake when 
an EU agency is strengthened (or established). Further, the revi-
sion is one of the first opportunities for the institutions to apply 
the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies and as a result, 
it should prove to be an interesting test case. From a legal perspec-
tive there is the question what the limits under the Treaties are to 
agencijication and whether the proposed new powers for the ERA 
respect these limits. 
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L - EU A GENCIFICATJON: A POLITICAL PEHSPECTIVE 
The EU agencies which form the constituent elements of EU 
agencification may be defined as permanent EU bodies established 
through secondary law and having their own legal personality, (1) 
'rh phenomenon of agencijication then has a twofold dim n ion. 
First, quantitativ ly n may obs rve !.hat th number of EU ag n-
j ,th ir staff and their budgets continuously in r as . Th qu tion 
why E agencie are being tablish d has long puzzled commenta-
tors but in r cent y at's a consensus s m to b emerging which 
g yond the original fun tionaJ a counts f agen y ration ( 
b I w), (2) A s nd dimension to agencijication is a qualitative 
one: where EU agencies were initially only granted modest non-deci-
sion making powers, the more recent agencies such as the European 
Supervisory Authorities in the financial sector have been granted very 
far-reaching powers, including the power to adopt binding decisions 
vis-a-vis market players or national authorities. Not only do recently 
established agencies generally have greater powers than the earlier 
ones, it may also be observed that when the mandate of an existing 
agency is reviewed the agency is usually conferred additional new 
powers by the legislator. An important question under this second 
dimension is what the dynamics are behind subsequent delegations to 
EU agencies. This has received much less attention in the academic 
debate than the question on why agencies are originally established. 
n. - EXPLAINING AGENCIFICATION 
A. - The initial choice to establish an agency 
Despite the academic attention devoted to the phenomenon, the 
dynamics behind agencij~cation do not seem fully understood yet. 
On the question why agencies are established in the first place, litera-
ture for a long time relied on functional accounts. (3) More recently a 
consensus seems to have emerged in that these functional accounts 
are insufficient to explain why specifically the agency instrument is 
( l ) III legal and political lite rature on o n.e ll al.s finds a re re r ncp l,) Lh autonomous, 
independent, cmi-aulo no mous, quasi· indcl)Cnde:nt, eLC. nalUre of lh s bodi . This clelllP-ll t. has 
ns Iou Iy bill n. Out Or Lhe working deJiniUon ' Inee it is v ry difficult to operaliollalizp- and 
th nul,onomy is in allY (;.1$ covt'J' d by the ag · ne i s' sepnratc legal pel'Soml.llty. 
(2) e also Marl.i.in IIm:NI,J-:f:II, 71t A11l0llorny of [.JW'CiptJ(£71 Agellcies: A ompnmtive Sludy 
oJ In~litnl'ional Development, Delft, Ehuron, 2009, p. Ill. 
(3) See ibid., pp. 100-/02. 
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chosen as a means to further administrative integration. As Thatcher 
noted "creating an [EU agency] is an institutional choice by policy-
makers with their own interests and strategies from among com-
peting alternatives, such as regulatory networks, regulation directly 
by the Commission or the traditional implementation method of 
implementation by national regulatory authorities monitored by the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice." (4) 
Thatcher then relies on 'previous patterns of delegation' to explain 
why (powerful) agencies have been established in some sectors but 
not in others. First, the Commission's position is important since it 
will not propose to establish new agencies in those sectors where 
these bodies might be a threat, to its own powers and if an agency 
is nonetheless established, the Commission will ensure its formal 
powers are modest. (5) In addition it will sometimes still agree to 
establish a powerful agency if this forms part of a trade off with grea-
ter integration within the EU context. (6) A second important actor 
according to THATCHER is the national agencies. If the Member States 
have established powerful national agencies, the latter will exert 
influence to ensure no strong EU agency is established, instead plea-
ding for formalised EU networks in which they can cooperate. (7) 
Thatcher's insights on previous patterns of delegation may serve 
as an illustration of the importance of identifying the relevant actors 
in agency creation. While it seems plausible that national agencies 
will be wary of bureaucratic competition from an EU body, it is 
important to note that the national agencies are not formal actors 
in the decision-making process at EU level. Whether their interests 
will be defended thus largely depends on the positions taken by their 
Member States in Council. 
The relevant actors then are the Commission, Parliament and 
Council. (8) Because the Commission does not only have a specific 
(4) Mark TIJ A'I'CIII-:II, 'The creation of European regulnlory agencip-s alld iLs limits: a compara-
t.ivp- analySis of Europcan delegalj on', (2011) 18 JE1'P, 6, p. 71)2, 
(5) Ibid., pp. 800-802. 
(6) See for instance thc restrictions on its [lowers uIHiP.r art. 290 and 291 TFEU whicll the 
Commission acccpted as pa rI. of the dcallo establish the ESA's. At the same time the COlllmission 
isslled a stat.p-ment explaining it had doubts whether these restrictions were in line with Ule Treat.y. 
Sep- Melijn CIIMION, 'Ell ageneies lJe lween 'Mp-rolli ' and 'ROlllan' or the devil and the <Ip-cp blue 
sea', (2011) 18 CMMiel)" 1, p. 1068. 
(7) Mark TIINI,(;IIER, JEPP, pn<!c., pp. 802-805. Tha tcher dop-s not mention possible disagrce-
mellt between Ul national agencies and the nationa l gOVP-J'l1l11ents who deddp- in tile COlUleil. 
The Ilational govcrrmlellts however will not necessarily dei'p-nd the specilic burea llcratic interests 
of their own agencies. 
(8) Daniel [(I·: I.I·:~IEN and Andrew TAIWAN'!", 'The political foundat.ions of the Ellrocracy', (2011) 31\ 
Wesl EU'I'Opean Politics 5, pp. 027-930. 
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bureaucratic interest but also supports deeper integration in gene-
ral, it may often support legislative initiatives which further integra_ 
tion, without promoting its own bureaucratic interests if securing 
both interests is politically difficult. (9) 
According to Kelemen and Tarrant the same two interests may be 
identified for the European Parliament, although they are comple-
mented by a third, i.e. the interest Parliament has in maximising its 
popularity amongst voters. According to Dehousse, the European 
Parliament further shares the Commission's lukewarm view to agen-
C'ijication, because it could undermine its recently acquired legisla-
tive powers. Kelemen and Tarrant however note that the Parliament 
is attracted by the agency model because it "was granted with consi-
derable oversight powers with respect to agencies." (10) Whether the 
Parliament indeed has considerable oversight powers may be doub-
ted. Such powers may only be gauged in relation to Parliament's 
oversight powers vis-a-vis the alternatives to agency creation. 
Relatively speaking, the Parliament indeed has greater oversight 
powers over agencies compared to the alternatives of indirect admi-
nistration and EU networks. However, compared to its powers over 
the Commission, its powers are far from 'considerable'. (11) As a 
result, Dehousse's observations seem to reflect the Parliament's posi-
tion better, which is inspired both by the concern for its legislative 
power as well as by its control function over the EU executive. 
As regards the Member States in Council, Kelemen and Tarrant 
echo the observations of Pollack and Franchino on the delegation 
of powers to the Commission, (12) in that Member States are caught 
between the need for credible commitment and actual delivery of 
the benefits of collective action and the desire for control over dis-
cretion exercised by EU actors. They also echo Thatcher's observa-
tion in that the previous patterns of delegation (to the Commission) 
may prevent them from delegating tasks to an EU agency, over which 
they would have greater control. Simply put, "[t]he advantage of an 
agency from the Member States' perspective is that it allows for 
(9) Ibid., 927-8; Hcnaud DI':IIOIJSSI':, 'Delegation of Powers in Ihe European Union: The Need for 
a Mull i-principals Model', (2008) 31 West fi:'U1'opean Politics 1, p, 796, 
(10) Daniel KELI:~mN and Andrew T,\I1I I~'r, We.~t B1£7"01Jf'.<tn PaN tics, prec" p, 929, 
(11) Sec also Christopl1 er LOIII', 'The Bllr pean 'P'lrlilllllenl. and the legitimation of agcncifi-
cation' , in Rittbergcr amI Wonka (ells_), ilg(!J7cy gOl)Ol7Ialwc 'in the FlU, London, [{outledge, 2011, 
pp. 131-47, 
(12) See Fabio FIIANCl llNO, The powe'l's of the Union: Delegation in the BU, Cambridge 
Universil.y Press, 2007; Mark POI.I.ACI<, 17w engines oJ EU1'Opean inteqmti,on: delegation, agency 
and agenda seUingin the FlU, Oxford University Press, 200:3, 
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the promotion of harmonised regulation, while entailing less loss of 
control than delegation directly to the Commission." (13) 
To conclude, the administrative integration brought by agencies 
may be explained by reference to the functional needs which agen-
cies fulfil, but the institutional choice of securing this integration 
through an agency seems better explained by the previous patterns 
of delegation noted by Thatcher and the strategic institutional beha-
viours described by Kelemen and Tarrant and Dehousse. 
B. - The subsequent choice to strengthen an existing agency 
Although Thatcher offers a, forceful explanation of the initial 
choice to establish an agency, the institutional dynamics following 
agency creation are a different matter. According to authors such as 
De Moor-van Vugt and Egeberg and Trondal agency creation is one of 
the phases of a broader trend in which the Commission tightens its 
grip on national administrations. De Moor-van Vugt explains how in a 
first phase, following the SEA, the EU entered into new policy fields 
and adopted directives of limited scope. Implementation and enfor-
cement of these common rules was left to the Member States and the 
principle of national (administrative) autonomy applied. However, 
such decentralised enforcement quickly becomes insufficient as poli-
cies become more ambitious. The Commission will therefore pro-
mote informal coordination between the Member States, to ensure 
(more) uniform implementation and enforcement. Building on these 
experiences, the coordination is formalised, often through EU agen-
cies. In subsequent legislation, the autonomy of national administra-
tion is further curtailed and more powers are granted to the agency 
(or the Commission). Egeberg and Trondal explain this trend as 
forming part of the creation of an executive centre at EU level. (14) 
According to Egeberg and Trondal, the Commission will also pro-
pose that independent national agencies be established. Once these 
bodies are dissociated from the traditional national administrations, 
the Commission can then more easily integrate them in a European 
administration. 
The embryonic models proposed by De Moor-van Vugt and Egeberg 
and Trondal certainly have an intuitive appeal to them, but they 
(13) Daniel KICI,EMEN and Andrew TAIII1ANT, West E'II:l'operJn PoliUcs, prec" p. H29, 
(11) Morten Er.:JmEIIG and .Jarle TII()NIlAI., 'EU-level agencies: new executive ccnlcr formal.ion 
or vehicles for national control,?" (2011) 18.fEPP G, pp, 8G8-ll. 
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heavily emphasise the influence of the Commission in this process 
giving the impression that the Commission dictates the extent and 
pace of agencification. In reality of course, before each phase, the 
Commission will have to broker an agreement with the Parliament 
and Council and a qualified majority of the Member States will have 
to agree to a further restriction of their national administrative auto-
nomy by conferring further powers on the EU actors concerned 
(Commission, agency or network). In addition, the emphasis on the 
Commission seems at odds with the explanations of agency creation 
presented above, which highlight the Member States' reticence for 
greater integration and their preference for agencies as a less supra-
national way of constructing a European Administrative Space. 
Under a historical new-institutional perspective, the decisional 
rules in the ordinary legislative procedure are an exponent of increa-
sing returns as they give each of the three major institutions involved 
the power to veto a possible abolishment of the agency. At the same 
time this means that each of these three institutions also has the 
power to veto an extension of the mandate of an agency, which is 
why it would be wrong to assume that the Commission determines 
the process of agencification. 
Still, the Commission will play a primordial role. As De Moor-
van Vugt explains, further agencification rests on the deficiencies 
in policy implementation. As a policy entrepreneur therefore, the 
Commission will plead for further administrative integration. To 
put this concretely for the case which will be elaborated below: 
the Commission will sell the idea of further administrative integra-
tion by highlighting that the objective of a common railway mar-
ket, to which the Member States have committed themselves, will 
remain dead letter unless further action is undertaken to secure pro-
per implementation. In theory, this action could take on any num-
ber of forms, including a complete overhaul of existing institutions 
and structures. However, given that a sector-specific agency already 
exists, the functional pressures for greater administrative integration 
will meet fewest resistance if they are channelled through this exis-
ting institutional arrangement. 
Here, different logics play at the same time. For the Corrunission, a 
'calculus approach', (15) will result in the conclusion that its resources 
(Hi) Peter [[ALl. and l?osemary TAYJ.OI1, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutioll<llisms', 
(1996) XLIV Political Studies, p. D39. 
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are best invested by elaborating existing arrangements instead of 
tlying to recast them, even if the agency instrument itself remains a 
second best alternative. The same applles to the Parliament which 
may have principled issues with the agency instrument and agen-
cification, but its resources are best invested in the pragmatism of 
influencing the provisions on the functioning of agencies instead of 
challenging the agency instrument as such. After all, under a 'cultu-
ral approach', (16) a logic of appropriateness has grown following 
two decades of agencification, in which the agency instrument is 
now seen as legitimate. As a result, if implementation deficiencies 
arise in a sector in which no agency so far exists, a proposal to esta-
blish an agency will have a head start against other possible alter-
natives. Similarly, if implementation problems persist and an agency 
is already establlshed, granting further powers to the agency will 
not be fundamentally contested. While this make the Commission's 
policy solution (extending the powers of an agency) acceptable, the 
Commission wlll further have to overcome resistance amongst the 
Member States (and the Parliament) by showing them that a political 
problem (insufficient implementation) exists, in casu, showing how 
the objective of an integrated railway sector is being undermined. 
This way, political backing is created and the three streams of pro-
blems, policies and politics are coupled under the entrepreneurship 
by the Commission. (17) For instance, in its communication on the 
fourth railway package, of which a strengthened ERA forms part, the 
Commission subtly reminds the Member States of their own com-
mitment: "At the European Council on 28-29 June 2012, the Heads 
of State or Government adopted the Compact for Growth and Jobs, 
which seeks to deepen the single market by removing barriers in order 
to promote growth and jobs in network industries. The Commission 
consequently identified the Fourth Railway Package as a key initia-
tive to generate growth in the EU." (18) The Commission also pres-
surised the Member States by commencing eleven infringement pro-
ceedings in 2010, (19) so that the judgments would be passed around 
(16) J/Jid. 
(17) Sce Hol.Jerl ACKIIIJ.I and Aclrian KAY, 'Mnltiple slreams in EU policy-making: Ihe case of the 
2005 sugar reform', (2011) 18 .lEPP, 1, p. 72. 
(18) European Commission, 'Colllmunication on Ihe Fourth H;tilway Package - Completing 
lhc Single European Railway Area 1.0 Foster European Competitiveness and Growth', COM (2013) 
25 [inal, p. 4. 
( 19) See Slcphane DE L, !tOSA onc! Cccilc RAI\)I~mT, 'La l.J«taille dl L rail a conunence. Premieres cll§ci-
SiOLl~ de la Cour de jlL~Uce sur la mise en ceuvrc des directives fcLTtlViaircs ', (2013) 23 },'m'Ope 7, pp. 6-11. 
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the time of the proposal of the fourth railway package which in turn 
would underscore the necessity of adopting the package. 
C. - The Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies 
In the absence of a framework, the process of agencij~cation 
has resulted in a great variety of agencies. In order to work out a 
more uniform model for future EU agencies the Commission pro-
posed an inter-institutional agreement in 2005. However, by 2008 it 
had become clear that the institutions would not be able to agree 
on a binding framework and ultimately they settled on the non-bin-
ding Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies in 2012. Apart 
from being non-binding, the Common Approach is also less far-rea-
ching than the Commission's draft inter-institutional agreement. (20) 
Still the Common Approach does contain some guidelines which the 
legislator is called upon to respect, also when an existing agency's 
establishing regulation is being reviewed. To implement the Common 
Approach, the Commission adopted a Roadmap in December 2012. 
As a result, the revision of the ERA regulation is one of the first 
opportunities, together with the proposed merger of Europol and 
CEPOL, (21) for the Commission and the legislator to show that they 
are serious about rationalising agencification. 
D.-EU agencification: a legal perspective 
From a legal perspective it has been said that EU agencification rests 
"on shaky legal grounds" (22) because the Treaties do not seem to leave 
much room for powerful independent administrative bodies within the 
EU (apart from the Commission). This is so because there is no clear 
legal basis to set up and empower agencies and because the power to 
adopt delegated and implementing acts is entrusted to the Commission. 
In addition, there is a broad consensus in legal doctrine that the Court's 
jurisprudence in the Meroni and Romano cases also apply to EU agen-
cies. Strictly applying these rulings to current EU agencies would mean 
(20) For a critical analysis of the Common Approach, see EIsa BICIINAllll, 'Accord sur les 
agences eUfopeennes: la montagne ar;couche d'une SOllriS', (2012) RDUE 3; Miroslava SCIIOI:I'I';N, 
'The Newly Released 'Common Approach' on Ell Agencies: Going Forward or Standing Still"', 
(20l2) Columbia Journal ofEu'/'OIJean Low Online, http://www.cjel.net/online/Hl_2-scholten. Last 
Accessed: 17 April 2013, 
(21) European Commission, 30 JanualY 2013, 'COnllllUllication from I,he Commission on 
The Fourth Railway Par;kage - Completing the Single Europcan Hailway Area to Foster European 
COIlIpetitiveness and Growth', COM (2013) 25 final. 
(22) Merijn CIIMION, CMLRev" prec., p. 1075. 
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however that they cannot adopt binding acts and cannot exercise dis-
cretionary powers, limits which today are clearly transgressed. 
Since these issues have already been extensively debated 
elsewhere, (23) they will not be commented upon further. In any case 
this debate may be decided in the near future by the Court of Justice 
itself. In UK v. Council & Parliament it has been asked, for the very 
first time, to assess the legality of an agency's powers under Meroni, 
Romano as well as under Articles 290 and 291 TFED. In UK v. Council 
& Parliament, the UK is challenging the ESMA's powers to prohibit 
(or impose conditions on) shorting under Regulation 236/2012. In the 
light of Meroni, this power is indeed questionable since it is gene-
rally accepted that that ruling prohibits the delegation of discretionary 
powers. However, the decision whether or not to prohibit shorting 
requires a balancing between different interests, notably that of finan-
cial stability and economic freedom and this balancing implies that the 
ESMA would have to make discretionary choices. Similarly, the deci-
sion to (temporarily) ban shorting would take the form of a generally 
binding act, while the Court in Romano prohibited a delegation of the 
power "to adopt acts having the force of law." (24) Apart from challen-
ging the Regulation on these two grounds, the UK also invokes two 
other grounds. Since the measures adopted by the ESMA under this 
power would be non-legislative acts of general application they would 
be contrary to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU which reserve the power to 
adopt delegated or implementing acts to the Commission. Fourthly if 
the ESMA would use this power to adopt individual decisions, the UK 
claims that the Regulation could not be based on Article 114 TFED. (25) 
It is clear that the repercussions of this case may stretch far beyond 
the financial regulation in the Internal Market by the ESMA: how far 
can the legislator go in empowering agencies; which regime applies 
to the delegation of powers to agencies; may the empowerment of an 
agency be described at all as a delegation; what role can agencies play 
in the procedures under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; etc. Whether these 
questions will be answered will depend on how the Court proceeds in 
(23) Sce ibid.; Stefan (;1111.1,1.:11 ,lIId Andreas OnAToII, 'Everything lwcler control? TIle 'way forward' 
for European agencies in the footsteps of the MI';IIONI tloctline', (2010) 35 EJ~Rev. 1. 
(24) See Case llS/SO, Rmnano, [19S1] ECR 1241, para. 20. _ 
(25) See Case C-270/12: Action brought on 1 June 2012 - W( v. Council, Parliament, O.J 
2012 C 273/3. The case has been ruled in the meantime. For a CliSCllssioll, see Merijn CIIMION, 'TIle 
clllpowenllellt of agencies Wider the MI.:I10NI doctrine and artiele 114 TFEU: cOlmect Oil United 
Kindgom v. Parliament and Council (sllOrl.-selling) ami the proposed single resolution mecha-
nism', (201<1) 3D ELRev. 3. 
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resolving the issues brought before it. In any event, there is the possi-
billty that the ERA's new proposed powers will need to be re-evaluated 
in the aftermath of UK v. Council and Parliament (c! infra). 
Ill. - TUE REVISION OF THE EHA's MANDATE AS A CASE OF AGENCIFICATION 
A. - The ERA's establishment and the first revision of its mandate 
The ERA was established in 2004 through Regulation 88112004, 
which was part of the second railway package, to secure the objec-
tive of an integrated railway sector by reinforcing safety and intero-
perablllty, i.a. helping to avoid that safety issues would be abused 
to continue market fragmentation. (26) To this end the ERA mainly 
had a pre-decision-making function, comparable to other agencies 
such as the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) and the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), whereby it provides the Commission 
with input for further legislation or implementing measures, the 
Commission remaining the competent authority to adopt the final 
act or legislative proposal. (27) 
In 2008, following the third railway package, the mandate of the 
ERA was revised for a first time and the amending regulation gave 
further pre-decision making powers to the agency. (28) More precisely, 
the regulation contained 7 new provisions allowing the Commission 
to request recommendations, reports or opinions from the ERA. It 
further contained 20 new provisions which directly instructed the 
ERA to propose draft measures, reports, opinions or recommenda-
tions to the Commission (without needing a request from the lat-
ter), including one general provision on support by the ERA to the 
Commission in its implementation function. The regulation further 
contained one provision allowing the Commission to request the 
ERA to monitor a national body and one provision allowing natio-
nal bodies to file requests for technical opinions. Lastly the ERA was 
also instructed to fulfil a number of operational tasks such as setting 
up and keeping registers. 
(2G) Esther VEI/SUIIS and Erika TAI<II, 'Improving compliance with European \Jnion law via 
ageneies: The case of the European Railway Agency', (2013) 51 JCMS 2, p. :322. 
(27) Ibid., 323; Maltijn GU{)Io;NI.EEI I, Michacl KAEIlIN<: and Esther VEUSLlJlS, 'Regulatory gover-
nance Ihro llgh agencies of the European Un ion? The role of the European agencies for maritime 
and aviation safety in Ille implementation of European transport legislation', (2010) 17 JEPP, 8. 
(28) See changes brought by Regulation (EC) 1835/2008, 0 . .1. 2008 L 354/5l. 
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B. - The fourth railway package and the second revision 
of its mandate 
Although the extended mandate further agencified regulation in 
the railway sector it did not fundamentally alter the powers of the 
ERA as its existing powers were 'merely' extended to new fields. 
As such, the ERA remained a 'pre-decision-making agency'. This 
would be different under the fourth railway package. In its propo-
sal the Commission also wants the ERA to exercise decision-making 
powers. The Commission clarified this was its preferred option out 
of the following alternatives: 
Option 1: Baseline scenarip (do nothing), continuing on the 
path that is currently set out for the sector: 
Option 2: Greater co01'dination role for the Agency in ensuring 
a consistent approach to certification of railway undertakings and 
vehicle authmisation. 
Option 8: ERA as a one-stop-shop, wheTe the final decision on 
certijication and authorisation remains with the NSAs but ERA 
performs entry and exit checks of applications and of the decisions. 
Option 4: ERA and NSAs shw"e competencies, where the final 
decision on certification and authorisation is taken by the Agency. 
Option 5: ERA takes over activities of NSAs in relation to cer-
tification of railway undertakings and vehicle authorisation. (29) 
The Commission thus proposed option 4 as being the most cost-
efficient which will see the ERA become responsible for safety cer-
tification and authorisation of vehicles and trackside control-com-
mand and signalling sub-systems. Under the third railway package 
and the safety and inter-operability directives these certificates and 
authorisations are granted by the national authorities, even if the 
substantial rules on which the certifIcates and authorisations are 
based are subject to harmonisation by the Commission through a 
comitology procedure, based on drafts prepared by the ERA. 
Under the fourth railway package the ERA would thus acquire 
the competence to issue safety certificates for railway undertakings 
and authorisations for vehicles and vehicle types as well as autho-
risations for trackside control-command and signalling sub-systems. 
(29) Elu'opean COIll\\lission, 'Collunission Staff Working Oocwnent: "llpact A.,sessmenl aCCOII'-
panying the proposals for tile FOlllth Ra ilway Package', SWO (2013) 8 filIal , pp. 22-23. (Hereinafter: 
llllpacl Assess\lIent). 
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How then does the Commission propose to 'share' these certifica-
tion and authorisation competences between the ERA and national 
authorities? This would be spelled out in the recast safety and inter-
operability directives. Article 10 of the former directive would then 
provide the ERA grants the single safety certificate and it would 
be assisted by the national authorities which would fulfil a role in 
verifying whether the undertakings continues to meet the require-
ments of the single safety certificate, notifying the ERA if they have 
doubts thereupon. (30) 
The technical specifications for inter-operability underlying the 
authorisations under the inter-operability directive were already 
adopted by the Commission following a draft by the ERA, but the 
ERA would now acquire competence to authorise trackside control-
command and signalling subsystems (authorising other fixed sub-
systems would remain a national competence). Further, the vehicle 
and vehicle types would also be authorised by the ERA, whereby the 
national authorities would cooperate with the ERA to disseminate 
the relevant guidance documents to applicants. (31) 
A further interesting provision in the new safety directive is the 
change proposed to Article (16) 1 on the national safety authori-
ties. Under the third railway package it is provided these bodies 
should be independent from market players but that they may form 
part of the 'Ministry responsible for transport matters', however the 
Commission now proposes to scrap this clarification. 
IV. - THE ERA's PROPOSED NEW POWERS: DYNAMICS OF FURTHER 
AGENCIFICAl'ION 
How do these changes fit with the frameworks set out above? At 
first sight they seem a confirmation of the propositions made by 
De Moor-van Vugt and Egeberg and Trondal since further powers 
are shifted from national authorities to the EU level. For the certifi-
cation and authorisation processes it is interesting to note that the 
Commission sees a 'sharing' of tasks between the ERA and natio-
nal authorities whereas for those certification and authorisation 
(30) See European COllllllissioll, 'Proposal for a direcLive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on railway safety', COM (2013) 31 final. 
C3l) See proposed art. 20 and 22 of European Commission, 'Proposal for a directive of the 
European Parlialllent and of the Council on I he inlcroperability of the rail system within!' the 
European Union', COM (2013) 30 final. 
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powers granted by the ERA, the national authorities actually sim-
ply work in support of the ERA, providing information to underta-
kings or keeping the ERA up to date on the situation 'on the ground'. 
However, unlike what the embryonic models set out above claim, the 
Commission is not strengthened under these proposals, although it 
should be noted that the new powers of ERA do not come at the 
expense of the Commission either and the Commission stays fully 
responsible for the rule making procedure, where the ERA retains 
its pre-decision-making role. 
On the other hand, the proposed amendment to the safety direc-
tive whereby the possibility of national safety authorities being 
housed inside the Ministries of Transport would be omitted, may 
also be read as a an attempt by the Commission to further dissociate 
these bodies from the traditional national administrations. If these 
bodies could no longer be housed within the traditional ministries, 
this would indeed facilitate a further linkage between these national 
bodies and the EU agencies, as Egeberg and Trondal have suggested. 
Applying Thatcher's previous patterns of delegation to the streng-
thening of an agency rather than the initial choice of establishing 
an agency one may note that, in line with Thatcher's model, (32) the 
new powers of the ERA would not come at the detriment of the 
Commission. However, the ERA would take over powers of natio-
nal bodies begging the question how this relates to the powers of 
the national authorities. Thatcher noted that "few Member States 
had an [independent authority] for chemicals, railways or air safety 
when [European agencies] were created (or even today). As a result, 
[European Agencies] in these domains could be set up without inte-
grating or posing a threat to [national authorities]." (33) Indeed, loo-
king at the (often recently established) national bodies in the railway 
sector, one could not say these are strong organisations which could 
prevent the transfer of part of their powers to the ERA. 
As regards the Member States' positions in Council, the question 
would seem to be whether the Commission can effectively convince 
them that a further shift of competences form the national level to 
the ERA is necessary to achieve an integrated European railway 
area, an objective which they have in principle subscribed to. In 
its Impact Assessment the Commission noted that not all national 
(32) Mark TIINI'clllm, JEPP, pr8c., p. 21, 
(3:3) ibid" pp, 24-2G, 
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bodies (Safety Authorities and Notifying Bodies) work efficiently 
resulting, together with a patchwork of national regimes, in long and 
costly procedures and access barriers. (34) However, options 2 & 3 
do not significantly affect national autonomy and the Commission 
itself admits that the beneficial effects of option 3 come very close 
to that of its preferred option 4. (35) 
There is less reason to suspect that the European Parliament will 
hesitate to support the centripetal aspects of the Commission's pro-
posals. As Lord discussed, even if the European Parliament is not 
an ardent suppOlter of the process of agencijication as such, it has 
often supported a further strengthening of agencies' power in its 
capacity of co-legislator. (36) As a matter of fact, during the nego-
tiations on the first revision of the ERA mandate, the Parliament 
suggested, unsuccessfully, to give an even greater role to the ERA. 
Further to the amendments of the Parliament, the ERA would have 
i.a. been able to issue technical opinions at the request of applicants 
who had received a negative decision from national safety authori-
ties and from 2015 onwards the ERA would have been competent to 
authorise the placing in service of vehicles. (37) The Commission has 
now picked up the latter suggestion in its current proposals under 
the fourth railway package. 
v. - THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL IN TI-Il~ LIGHT OF TI-IE COMMON ApPROACH 
In its proposal, the Commission indicated that some of the pro-
posed changes were drafted following the Common Approach, i.a. 
allowing for more flexibility in its staff recruitment. The most impor-
tant elements from this perspective are those concerning the (multi-) 
annual work programmes, the ERA's international relations and its 
headquarters agreement. 
Because the Conunon Approach emphasised the (multi-)annual work 
programme as a key instrument for assessing an agency's functioning, 
(:31) ImpaeL Assessment, p. 12. 
(:35) The cost savings tmder option 3 as projected by the Commission are only slightly lower 
than those for option 1 and a l1J101lgh option 3 misses ils time reduction target it only does SO by 
2% (18% redu <.: tion instead of 20%). See itllpact fu;seSslllent, pp_ 46-48. 
(36) Christopher J~)lll), in RittLerger and WOllka (eds), pree., p_ 1:37. 
(37) See proposed art. 8a (6) and 10 (3a) following the Posit.ion of the EUI'O[1c,m Pal'liall1ent 
adopt.ed at first. reading on 2H November 2007 with a view t.o the adop tion of Regulation (BC) No. 
_..12008 of the European Parliament and of the COW1Ci! amending Regulation (EC) No 88 1/2001 
establishing a European Hai lway Agency_ Ul timately 1118 instilutions seWed on a mutual recogni-
tion of authorisatiolls (rather than a single European authorisation) and the possibility for the 
national appeal body (but not the applicant) to request a technical opinion frolll the ERA. 
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a separate Article in the proposal is dedicated to it. The Article 
itself however only brings together the already existing provisions 
and contains nothing new apart from the multi-annual work pro-
gramme which the EHA is now also obliged to prepare and adopt. 
The Common Approach also suggested that the agencies' internatio-
nal relations should be streamlined and governed by working agree-
ments with their parent DG's, further making clear that agencies 
could never represent the EU's position externally or enter into bin-
ding commitments on behalf of the EU. The proposal now makes 
clear that the ERA is allowed to develop contacts and enter into 
administrative agreements with international partners, without pre-
judice to the competences of ,the EU's institutions, the European 
External Action Service and the Member States. The proposal further 
explicates that the agency cannot create legal obligations in respect 
of the Union or the Member States and that the ERA should detail 
its international strategy in its work programmes. In short, the pro-
posal makes clear that ERA's international activities may never pre-
judice the institutions' and Member States' prerogatives, but it does 
not really clarify the nature of ERA's international relations. 
In line with the ConuTIon Approach, the proposal contains a provision 
instructing the agency and (especially) the host state to conclude a hea-
dquarters agreement by 2015. In addition it instructs the "host Member 
State [tol provide the best possible conditions to ensure the proper 
functioning of the Agency, including multilingual, European-oriented 
schooling and appropriate transport connections." This may seem self-
evident but has been rather problematic for the ERA in the past. (38) 
Overall, for a number of reasons the impact of the Common 
Approach on the Commission's proposal does not seem that great. 
Firstly, the impact which the Common Approach could have had 
would always have been be greater for new agencies rather than for 
agencies whose mandate is reviewed. Secondly, the impact is difficult 
to assess in any case since the Common Approach itself is merely a 
codification of already existing practices rather than a brand new 
approach. (39) As a result, some of the proposed changes which seem 
inspired by the Common Approach would have been suggested by the 
(38) See i.a. Decision n" GO of the ERA Administrative Board adopting the Multi-Annual Staff 
Policy Plan 2012-1 4, p_ 15; HA~11 1()1.1. Heport, "Evaluation of the Ell decentralised agencies in 2009", 
Fi1lal Report, Vo!. lJJ, p_ 143_ 
(39) Even before the COllllll0n A[1proach for instance, the legislator Ilad developed a practice 
of including provisions on a headquarters agreement in (new) agencies' regulations_ With I he revi-
sion of the FroTltex mandate in 2011 it extended this prac:1 ice to existing agencies. 
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Commission even in absence of the Common Approach. Thirdly, the 
impact of the Corrunon Approach depends on the implementation of 
the Commission's road map but the road map itself had only been 
adopted one month prior to the proposals for a fourth railway pac-
kage and has not been completely implemented yet. 
VI. - THE ERA's NEW POWERS FROM A LEGAL P8nSPECTlVE 
From a legal perspective, ERA's new powers as proposed by the 
Commission are significant, since it is the first time that an agency 
which had not been originally established as a decision-making 
agency is granted decision-malcing powers. Still, they are not revo-
lutionary, since they do not go beyond the powers granted to the 
already existing decision-making agencies. Seen from this perspective 
one would be inclined to say that these new powers are unproblema-
tic. After all, the system of a decision-malcing agency together with 
a Board of Appeal have been tried and tested since the mid-1990's 
by agencies such as the Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal 
Market (ORIM) and the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO). 
In light of the pending case UK v. Council & Parliament however, 
this appraisal could change. It should be noted that the powers exer-
cised by agencies such as the ORIM, CPVO, the European Aviation 
Safety Agency, etc. have always been questionable in the light of 
Meroni and Romano but no party has ever raised this issue before 
the Court. In UK v. Council & Parliament however, the UK has now 
challenged one of the powers granted to the ESMA in the light of 
Memni, Romano and Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Unless the Court 
follows the suggestion by Advocate General Jaaskinen and solves 
the case by upholding the UK's fourth plea on Article 114 TFEU as 
a wrong legal basis, (40) it will address these constitutional issues. 
Depending on how the Court will proceed in solving these legal ques-
tions brought before it, the repercussions of the case could also affect 
the revision of ERA's powers under the fourth railway package. 
VII. - UK V. COUNCIL AND PARLIAMENT 
The Court has a number of options and as regards its own case law 
one can envisage roughly four. A first is the most radical, where the 
Court would conclude that Meroni and/or Romano are not relevant 
(40) Sce Opinion of AG JAASKINEN in Case C-270112, [If( '/}. Council & Pm'liammu, nyr, 
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anymore under current EU law. Espe ially for MeToni, but al for 
Romano the reasons for such a move have be n explor d in do -
trine. (41) Such a move would be inspil' d by practical r asons which 
were already put forward in the 1960's (42) and which only hav gai-
ned weight since then. From the Court's legal perspective, the qua-
litative change from the ECSC Treaty (Meroni) and the EEC Treaty 
(Romano) to the EU Treaties under Lisbon could be used to argue 
that Meroni and Romano should not be upheld anymore. Although 
this would be easier to argue for Meroni than for Romano, the Court 
in both cases could argue that the legislator should be able to grant 
significant powers to EU agencies, given the expanded reach of EU 
law since the Single European,Act and given the ejjet utile principle. 
As to the choice for an EU agency rather than another alternative, 
one could argue that the agency instrument strikes a good balance 
between the principle of ejjet utile and the principle of subsidiarity, 
compared to conferring implementing powers on the Commission. 
The latter option would also secure a uniform application of EU 
law, but it would cut off national authorities from the implementing 
process. (43) 
A second option which would produce about the same effects 
would be to hold that Meroni and Romano do not apply to the 'dele-
gations' to EU agencies, without the Court having to depart from or 
renounce its earlier jurisprudence. Such a ruling would be perfectly 
possible because already in its existing jurisprudence it is impossible 
to identify one single legal regime which applies to all the different 
forms of delegation which have been elaborated under primary and 
secondary EU law. (44) The delegations to the Commission under the 
old Article 155 EEC were organised along the lines first set out in 
(4 J) S . for in tan<:c RcmulcI Df;IIOUSSI';, 'Misl1ls: l!: Law and the '!Tan fOJ1l1alion of Burop an 
Coveman c', ill J IlP.l«lffi and Df:lI() ;SI! ( ds), Good Govcl'l1ance i n f:,'u7'ope's int.egrulecl Mal'kat 
Ox.ford Universi y Ires<;, 2002, p. 22 1; I .,mien Gf:1lI\1I1 , '111 ' DevelopmenL of 8uropcan R ' gulutory 
Agencies: What U1C EU hould learn (rom th Alii riean Exp Ji 11 ',(2004) II JEL l, p. 10; 
T M ZWhlrr, 'La POl1J's uite elu P re Meroni all pOIl1'(llIoi IllS ttgeuc pourraieJlL jouer 1111 r61 piu 
CII vu dans I' nion .uropec,mc', in DIn'IIP-H. Ill; LA ROCIIP.IU: (cd.), L'£'xticlttion (llL Droit d l'lhtio71, 
ellln1 M6cani mcs Cqm'lIlmla1~U!f,7'l1S et DI'Oil.~ Nati(Jlla?tX, UruxeJles, nruylant, 2009, p. 166. 
(<12) Sce ror ins lanc Ulrieh EVI!UlJNG, 'ZlIr Erri 'J,lung !la 'hge rdneLer Bc!lo'rden der 
Komml iOIl d Europilischen WirLschaffsg III 'inschafL', In II AIJ.sn;IN ANI) & ;111,11 ' lIhUf:1l (etls), 
Z'U1' in legration E1/.1'O])as, KllTlsnahe, MWler. 1!J65, p. 11. 
(43) Of comse nation,lI autho.ili s would not be Cl,t on completely, ~ince fhe COl1l1nission 
wonld probably exercise thes · 'olllpel lie s under a (:omitology procedure. But the nat.ional 
authorities' role would still bll rnore IimiWd than the role they can play ill ('lroceclures illvoh~llg 
(both) agencies (and comitology). 
(44) See also Yvcs G"'LJTIEII, La delegation en d'l'Oit comm1lnantaim, StJ'asbollrg, lJniversite 
Strasbourg :3, 1995, these lIlultigraphiec, p. 161. 
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Koster and then Germany v. Commission. (45) The rules laid down 
in that jurisprudence are different from the rules governing dele-
gations to private bodies such as Meroni, taken over in DIR Film 
International. (46) The rules on delegations or conferrals to bodies 
under international public law are still different. (47) Lastly, with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 290 TFEU established 
yet another legal regime. Given this existing multiplicity, it would not 
be too far-fetched to suggest that the Court could rule that the legal 
regime governing the empowerment of agencies is again different 
from the existing regimes. 
A third option would be that the Court confirms that Meroni and/or 
Romano govern the empowerment of EU agencies (possibly consti-
tuting a single legal regime) while applying a 'light' interpretation of 
those rulings. The concepts used in these two cases are not immune 
from discussion. By adopting a narrow definition of 'discretionary' 
(or an expansive definition of 'executive') and a narrow definition of 
'acts having the force of law', the Court could allow for the present 
and further (qualitative) agencification. For instance, 'acts having 
the force of law' could be interpreted as being formal legislation. 
Discretionary powers could be interpreted as the competence to 
make final discretionary choices. Pushing this option to its extremes, 
the end result could be the same as under the second option since 
the Court would only formally start from Meroni and/or Romano 
to end up with a legal regime which would significantly differ from 
the regimes originally set out in those rulings. However, it cannot be 
ruled out that the Court picks this option and still concludes that the 
empowerment of the EMSA under Regulation 236/2012 is incompa-
tible with the Treaties. 
A last option is the simplest. The Court would confirm that 
Meroni and/or Romano apply to EU agencies and it could further 
(45) See Case 25170, Kos/,cl', [1970J I':CH 1161; Case C-240/90, Gm'man'l} 'U, Commission, 11992J 
ECR [-5383. . 
(46) See Joined Cases T-3G9/94 & T-85195, DIR Intemational Film, 11D08J I':CH 11-357. 
(47) The COLUt has accepted that the EU JlJay become Palty to the constituent instrumellts 
of intelllational organisalions, conferring [lowers on these organisat.ions, and lhat tile EU may 
subsequently be bound by rules established by such organisations. The Court does not so much 
emphasise the control over these organisations, which would be illusionary in multilateral forums, 
instead it em[lhasises III at the nature of IllC powers of the EU must be retained and the Ell's auto-
nomy safeguarded. See Opinion 1/92 re, DmJt agreement Imtween ate Communi/,y, on t.he one 
hand,. a.nd tlw count1'ies of the EU'/'opean Free Trade Association, on the othe?; 1'eiating to the 
C'/'eatwn Of the P:uTOpean Economic A?'ca, 11902j ECH 1-2821, para. 11; O[linion 1/00 re, Pl'Oposed 
aqreement bel.w cen the Eumpean Community and non-Mmnber States on the establishment of 
a HU'I'Opflan Common Aviat'ion A1"ea , [2002] ECR 1-3493, pal'as 11-4. 
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confirm that thes two rulings set out a singl 1 gal regim g ver-
ning t.h rune type of'd legation'. Without an adaptation of these 
rulings to the cunent I. gal, political and administrative context th 
Gour would b bound to find the empow rment f th E MA und r 
Regulation 236/2012 ill · gal since the ESMA has to make dis r tio-
nary choi 'es when it d cide to prohibit or imp os conditions on 
hort selling ruld b aus its prohibition or its m asm imposing 
condition would be an act having the force of law. 
The options open to the Court on the UK's third plea on 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are a different matter. Whereas the Court 
itself left a sufficient margin in its rulings in Meroni and Romano to 
allow for a more flexible interpretation of those judgments in the light 
of the current context, the Articles 290 and 291 TFEU seem to leave 
less room for manoeuvre. These Articles seem to have reinforced 
the Commission's position and the only actors they mention are the 
Parliament, the Council, the Corrunission and the Member States. The 
UK argues that the measures which the ESMA would adopt would be 
delegated or implementing acts only but in name and they should there-
fore also be recognised as such. This would mean that this competence 
cannot be granted to the ESMA since it is exclusive to the Commission. 
The Court could rule that the Treaties are not exhaustive on this 
point, meaning there may be generally applicable measures which 
do not belong to the categories of delegated and implementing acts 
or formal legislation and since such measures would not fit the exis-
ting categories, they would not necessarily need to be adopted by the 
Commission. With some imagination, Article 290 TFEU could even be 
read in this light since it provides that "[a] legislative act may delegate 
to the Commission" (own emphasis) the power to adopt delegated acts. 
The possibility reflected in 'may' would then not only relate to the 
legislator's freedom to empower the Commission, but also to its free-
dom to select the delegated authority of its choice. Yet, such an argu-
ment could only be upheld based on a purely textual interpretation 
and, put into its context, Article 290 TFEU employs 'may' rather than 
'shall' since otherwise the legislator would not be allowed to deal 
with the non-essential elements of legislation itself. Obviously, should 
the legislator want to, it should have the possibility to deal with all 
the elements of legislation, essential as well as non-essentiaL (48) 
(18) Under art. 291 TFEU iJle situation is com[lletely clear since (hat art. provides that legally 
binding acts "shall confer implemenl.ing powers on the Commission or in dully justified speci-
lic cases [ .. . ] on the Council" (own elllphasis). Impl r.menl.ing acts can therefore only be adopl.ed 
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Similarly it would seem rather far-fetched to argue that the Treaty 
authors provided for the delegated act of Article 290 TFEU as only 
one possible non-legislative act of general application, leaving it to 
the legislator to devise other alternative categories of such acts. 
Of course, one could imagine a number of scenarios in between the 
two extremes of the Commission being the sole responsible autho-
rity under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and that of the Commission's 
position being completely undermined by the empowerment of other 
bodies. However, the problem here is that it is not really the task of 
the Court to define those 'exceptional situations' in which delega-
ted or implementing acts could perhaps be adopted by bodies other 
than the Commission. 
At the same time, nothing in the provisions of Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU prevents the legislator from prescribing the Commission 
should request and take account of the advice of other bodies, such 
as EU agencies, before it adopts delegated or implementing acts. 
This would mean there is ample room for the involvement of such 
bodies in these procedures, as long as the ultimate authority in these 
procedures is the Commission. 
VIII. - TIlE ERA's POWP-RS UNDElt TIlE FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE REVISITED 
What could all this mean for the ERA's new powers under the 
fourth railway package? It should be clear that the ERA would exer-
cise discretionary powers and that it would adopt binding acts. As a 
result, should the Court rule that Meroni and Romano apply to the 
ESMA (and hence to other EU agencies), it would need to (re-)define 
the notions of 'discretionary choices' and 'acts having the force of 
law' narrowly in order for the ERA to be vested with its new powers. 
As noted above, as regards the Meroni and Romano jurisprudence 
there is a rather easy escape route but the UK's plea relating to the 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU is a different matter. 
Looking for instance at the vehicle authorisations which the ERA 
would issue, one would be inclined to say that this power is taken 
from the national authorities and given to the EU authority to ensure 
by the Commbsion or lhe CounciL In addition these implementing powers shall be provided for 
"where IUli/"orm conditions for illlplementing legally binding Union acts are needed." It would thus 
seem illlpossible to grant. sui generis implell1 enting powers 10 agencies oul~ide alt. ~91 TFEU once 
il is established that these powers relate to the need for uniform conditions to apply to the imple-
menta tion of (formal and I))atelial ) legislation. 
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that uniform condition in Lh imp I mentation of E rules apply. As 
it happens this is the v ry 'rai 'on d'etre d rib d by Article 291 
'fFEU, why impl menting pow 1'S at vested in the ommission (or 
exceptionally the Council). Furthermore, Article 291 TFEU is very 
clear as it prescribes that. the acts requiring implementation "shall 
confer implement.ing powers on the Commission." How then could 
the legislator, under the fourth railway package, grant such powers 
to the ERA, bypassing the Commission? (49) Although the UK's third 
plea ultimately begs this question, the Court could probably decide 
t.he case UJ{ V. Council and Parliament without having to touch 
upon t.he issue thereby leaving it undisturbed. Otherwise a signifi-
cant part of the powers already exercised by EU agencies would be 
undermined, since from a simple reading of t.he Treaties it would 
appear that only procedures whereby agencies draft decisions and 
the Commission adopts them, such as those involving the EMA and 
the EFSA, are permissible. 
However, because UJ{ V. Council and Parliament does not imme-
diately concern the ERA and because the powers which would be 
granted to the ERA are different from the ESMA's powers questioned 
by the UK, it is doubtful that. the institutions will take much account 
of the possible consequences of this case for t.he fourth railway pac-
kage, even if is advisable they would. In t.he end, more than t.wenty 
years of institutional practice involving a legally questionable quali-
t.ative agencification has already made it. virtually impossible for t.he 
Court to uphold its previous jurisprudence without reinterpreting it, 
even if institutional practice could not. be invoked before the Court 
to deviat.e from express Treat.y provisions. (50) 
CONCLUSION 
Under the fourth railway package, t.he Commission proposes to 
strengt.hen t.he ERA, granting it new powers which are taken away 
from the national authorities. In line with Thatcher it seems doubt.ful 
these authorities could prevent such a transfer of power, given that 
in most Member States they are not powerful and well established 
09) AG Jiiiiskinen however believes this shollld be [lossiblc. See Opinion of AG .JMsKI NI:N in 
Case C-270/12, W( 'V. COll:n.cil & ['a1'liam.enl., ECLI:ElJ:C:2013:[)G2 paras 8G-87. 
(50) See Opinion of AG POIAlms MAIII1I10 in Case C-133/06, EU'I'Opcan Pa1'liament 'V. Cou.ncil, 
[2008J Eel( 1-3189, para. 29. 
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players. In addition, in the EU legislative process they are not veto 
players either. Whether and to which extent the EHA will be streng-
thened will therefore depend on an accord between the Commission, 
Council and the Parliament. Since the latter in the past has been 
more keen than the Member States to transfer powers to the ERA, 
the Commission will foremost have to convince the Member States 
that a strengthened EHA (and therefore a transfer of powers from 
the national to the EU level) is necessary to achieve the objective of 
a single integrated railway market to which the Member States have 
(in principle) subscribed. 
The process by which the regulation of the railway sector is being 
Europeanised indeed much resembles the models worked out by De 
Moor-van Vugt and Egeberg and Trondal, even if in this specific case 
it is not so much the Commission but the ERA which is strengthened, 
to the detriment of the national authorities. The Commission's attempt 
to detach the latter from their ministries fits very well with the 'exe-
cutive centre formation' proposed by Egeberg and Trondal, whereby 
the Conunission is forging direct links with the experts in independent 
national authorities, bypassing the traditional national ministries 
under the control of national governments. As regards the Conunon 
Approach, the Commission's proposals do not succeed in silencing its 
critical reception. Even if a number of mitigating circumstances may 
be invoked, the effects of the Common Approach appear limited so far. 
From a legal perspective it is interesting to see that the ERA 
would be 'upgraded' to a genuine decision-making agency, even if it 
would not become as powerful as agencies such as the EASA or the 
European Supervisory Authorities in the financial sector. If it had 
not been for the pending case UK v. Council and Parliament, the 
ERA's new proposed power would hardly be contestable since they 
are no different from the powers which half a dozen of other agen-
cies are already exercising. In the currently pending case, the rela-
tionship between the EU agencies and AIticles 290 and 291 TFEU as 
well as the Mero'n1: and Romano jurisprudence is put to the Court for 
the very first time. However, even if it is almost certain that this case 
will have some repercussions for the process of agencijication, and 
hence for the ERA, it is not to be expected that the ED institutions 
will put the discussions on the fourth railway package on a hold in 
anticipation of the Court's ruling. 
mWYLANT 
LES CONDITIONS CONTRACTUELLES D'ACCES 
DES ENTREPRISES DE TRANSPORT DE MARCHANDISES 
AUX INFRASTRUCTURES FERROVIAIRES 
PAR 
MAGALI BOUTEILLE 
ET 
JULlEN GEFFARD" 
Le transport ferroviaire de marchandises est malade. En 2002 deja, 
seulement 20 % du transport de marchandises en France etait effectue 
par chemin de fer, contre 46 % en 1974 alors qu'en Europe, cette part 
etait de 14 % en 2002 contre 29 % en 1974. En Allemagne, les modes 
alternatifs au transport routier representent 30 % des tonnes/km; en 
France, ils ne depassent pas 11 % dont 8,8 % pour le ferroviaire (1). 
Des solutions pour relancer le fret ferroviaire ont bien ete envisa-
gees notamment dans le sillage du Grenelle de l'environnement ou 
encore du plan national de relance du fret et du contrat de perfor-
mance entre l'Etat et RFF Les causes du malaise sont nombreuses et 
non resolues a ce jour : la crise bien evidemment, les effets de la 
competitivite intermodale ; la fiabilite du service de transport, la 
qualite des sillons ; le coUt du travail a la SNCF egalement pour 
partie supporte par les nouveaux operateurs qui se le voient refac-
turer pour l'utilisation des infrastructures; la mauvaise interoperabi-
lite des reseaux pour les circulations transfrontalieres. Par-dela ces 
causes, dont il ne s'agit pas de contester la putt de responsabllite 
dans le declin que vit actuellement le secteur du transport ferroviaire 
• Les propos doivent etre eonsideres conlllle propres a jeur alltcllr et peuvent lie pas refleter 
une position cxprimee par I'ARAF. 
(1) Voy. rapports du COllseil general de l'envirOlU1emcnt et ell! developpcment dlll'able. 
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